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Comments
Third Party Liability and the Medi-Cal
Program: Administratively
Inconsistent, Judicially
Inequitable
The California Medical Assistance Program, entitled Medi-Cal,' was
enacted by the California State Legislature in 19652 to provide state-
funded medical care to indigents.3 The intent of the Legislature was to
provide "mainstream" medical care to those in need.4 Since the pro-
gram was enacted, it has undergone many changes, adapting its struc-
ture to meet the needs of the recipients and to encourage health care
providers to participate.5 Nevertheless, both providers and benefi-
ciaries remain somewhat dissatisfied with the Medi-Cal program. One
area in particular with which providers are dissatisfied is the program's
relatively low reimbursement rates.6 Providers are effectively locked
into rates established by the program since they must agree to accept
Medi-Cal payment as payment in full for services provided to Medi-
Cal beneficiaries.7 The provider is prohibited from "balance billing"'
the beneficiary or any other person.9
The State, however, has carved out an exception to this law I° that
serves as a marginal incentive to providers. If the recipient has other
health insurance coverage, the provider or Medi-Cal may bill the in-
surer.I If the provider bills the insurer and the insurer pays more than
Medi-Cal, the provider may retain the entire amount paid to him or
1. 22 CAL. ADM. CODE §50003.
2. CAL. STAT. 1965, c. 4, §2, at 103.
3. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §14000.
4. California Medical Ass'n v. Brian, 30 Cal. App. 3d 637, 642, 106 Cal. Rptr. 555, 558
(1973).
5. See CAL. DEPT. OF HEALTH SERVICES, CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, DATA MAT-
TERS TOPICAL REPORT, 4-27 (July 1980) [hereinafter cited as TOPICAL REPORT].
6. See CAL. DEPT. OF HEALTH SERVICES, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE,
REVIEW OF PHYSICIAN AND DENTAL REIMBURSEMENT LEVELS IN THE MEDI-CAL PROGRAM, 5-7
(Jan. 1981) [hereinafter cited as REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR].
7. 22 CAL. ADM. CODE §§51002, 51471; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §14019.4.
8. Balance billing is the term commonly used to describe the practice whereby a provider of
health care under the Medi-Cal program bills a beneficiary for the "balance" of his or her bill
remaining unpaid after Medi-Cal's payment to the provider. See CAL. DEPT. OF HEALTH SERV-
ICES, MEDI-CAL BULLETIN No. 62, at 2 (Nov. 1976).
9. 22 CAL. ADM. CODE §§51002, 51471; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §14019.4.
10. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§14019.3, 14019.4.
11. Id; CAL. DEPT. OF HEALTH SERVICES, MEDI-CAL BULLETIN No. 106 (Nov. 1979).
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her by the insurer.1 2 Conversely, if Medi-Cal collects from the insurer
more than it paid the provider, the program must pay the provider the
excess, up to the amount the provider billed the program. 13 Many prov-
iders would like to see the creation of a second exception to this rule. 14
This exception would allow providers to receive up to their "usual and
customary fee" 5 in those cases in which a recipient is injured by a
liable third party and subsequently receives a tort recovery for the inju-
ries. Under the current interpretation of the law by the State providers
are not allowed to receive compensation above the Medi-Cal payment
rate from tort recoveries once the provider has accepted Medi-Cal as
payment for the services. 6 Nevertheless, two recent trial courts have
differed on the interpretation of this law."' One case held that provid-
ers may receive additional compensation from a tort recovery, up to the
difference between the actual amount the provider billed the program
for the services provided and the amount paid by Medi-Cal.' The sec-
ond case prohibited this practice.' 9 The purpose of this comment is to
explain and analyze the impact of the current policy of the State con-
cerning third party liability and the Medi-Cal program. This wil be
accomplished by demonstrating that the rationale of the State for dis-
tinguishing between "other coverage" and "third party liability" is un-
fair to providers and may result in a windfall to beneficiaries and by
discussing Medi-Cal's application of third party liability in relation to
the general theories of tort law and damages, focusing on the inequities
of the current law. A suggested solution to this inconsistent and inequi-
table application of the law will be presented through proposed legisla-
tion.z0 Before specifically discussing third party liability, the following
12. See 22 CAL. ADM. CODE §51471(a)(1).
13. 22 CAL. ADM. CODE §51005(d).
14. See generally Winter v. Gnaizda, 90 Cal. App. 3d 750, 152 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1979) (reciting
facts); Palumbo v. Myers. No. 287983 (Super. Ct., Sacramento, 1981); Cal. Med. Ass'n News, V. 2,
No. 30 (Sept. 4, 1981).
15. The usual and customary fee is that amount the provider would normally charge the
general public for a particular service. The usual and customary fee may also be construed to
mean the fee most often charged to the general public by a particular type of provider for a
specific service in a specific profession, community, or in the country.
16. Letter from Carlo Michelotti, Chief Operations Unit, Cal. Dept. of Health Services to
Diane Jimenez, Manager, Medi-Cal Intermediary Operations (MIO), MIO Operating Instructions
Letter Reference No. 51-79 (Aug. 15, 1979) (copy on file at Pacj¢c Law Journal); letter from Rich-
ard H. Koppes, Chief Counsel, Cal. Dept. of Health Services to Mary R. Solbakken (Nov. 24,
1978) (copy on file at Pacfc Law Journal).
17. Palumbo v. Myers, No. 287983 (Super. Ct., Sacramento, 1981); Winter v. Gnaizda, No.
444951 (Super. Ct. Alameda, 1979).
18. 90 Cal. App. 3d 750, 754, 152 Cal. Rptr. 700, 702 (1979).
19. Palumbo v. Myers, No. 287983 (Super. Ct., Sacramento, 1981).
20. The scope of this comment will be limited in discussion to Medi-Cal providers who are
paid according to a set fee schedule developed by the State. There are, however, five methods of
payment used to reimburse providers under the Medi-Cal program: (1) retroactive reasonable
costs-per diem (in-patient services); (2) prospective per diem (skilled nursing facilities and inter-
mediate care facilities); (3) capitation rates (pre-paid health plans and dental services); (4) cost
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section will provide a brief history of the Medi-Cal program.
MEDI-CAL: CALIFORNIA'S MEDICAID PROGRAM
In 1965, under Title XIX of the Social Security Act,21 commonly re-
ferred to as Medicaid,22 Congress authorized grants to states for medi-
cal assistance programs for the purpose of enabling each state, as far as
practicable under the conditions in the state, to furnish medical assis-
tance to eligible persons. 3 The intent of the Legislature in enacting the
Medicaid law was to provide "mainstream" medical care to indigents
so that they could have access to private practitioners of their choice
and not be relegated to a county or municipal hospital program.24 This
legislation resulted in a comprehensive federal-state program for medi-
cal care,2' whereby states are partially reimbursed by the federal gov-
ernment for medical assistance programs.26 Although the Medicaid
program is federally funded,27 it is administered by the individual
states.28 Participation by a state is voluntary,29 but if the state elects to
participate, it must comply with federal statutes and regulations3 ° to
remain eligible for federal funds for the state's Medicaid program.3 '
The Medi-Cal program32 was enacted in California to take advan-
tage of the federal funds made available by the Title XIX amendments
to the Social Security Act.33 The purpose of Medi-Cal was to provide
health care and related remedial or preventive services to indigent per-
sons.34 To qualify for federal funding under Title XIX, the Medi-Cal
program is required to submit a state plan to the Department of Health
plus professional component (drugs); (5) fee for service schedule (physicians, other individual
practitioners, non-institutional providers, e.g., medical transportation, other hospital services, e.g.,
hospital out-patient, and medical equipment). This comment will analyze the inequitites of the
current law as applied to providers paid using a fee for service schedule. The inequities would
exist with the other methods of payment, however, it would be more difficult for the reader to
comprehend without a detailed understanding of the Medi-Cal program. See California Depart-
ment of Finance, Program Evaluation Unit, Medi-Cal Rate Development and Review (Oct. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as Rate Development].
21. 42 U.S.C. §§1396, 1396a-j (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
22. 42 C.F.R. §430.1 (1980).
23. 42 U.S.C. §1396 (1976 & Supp. 111 1979).
24. California Medical Ass'n v. Brian, 30 Cal. App. 3d 637, 642, 106 Cal. Rptr. 555, 558
(1973).
25. See Wilczynski v. Harder, 323 F. Supp. 509, 511 n.1 (D. Conn. 1971).
26. 42 U.S.C. §§1396b, 1396d(b) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
27. Id
28. James v. Harris, 499 F. Supp. 594, 595 (D. Ala. 1980); 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(5) (1976); 42
C.F.R. §§431.10(a), (b) (1980).
29. Alabama Nursing Home Ass'n v. Harris, 617 F.2d 388, 396 (D. Ala. 1980); Planned
Parenthood Affiliates of Ohio v. Rhodes, 477 F. Supp. 529, 535 (D. Ohio 1979).
30. 42 U.S.C. §§1396, 1396a-j (1976 & Supp. 111 1979).
31. Id
32. 22 CAL. ADM. CODE §50003.
33. TOPICAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 1.
34. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §14000.
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and Human Services, which must be approved by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services.35 This plan provides assurance of state
compliance with federal Medicaid requirements.36 A portion of the
plan must specifically address the area of third party liability.37 The
following section will focus on how California has met the federal re-
quirements regarding third party liability and the subsequent impact
on Medi-Cal providers.
THIRD PARTY LIABILITY AND THE MEDI-CAL PROGRAM
Title XIX of the Social Security Act3" and the California Welfare
and Institutions Code39 require Medi-Cal to be the payer of last resort
for the beneficiary's medical services. Medi-Cal is not finally liable for
payment for the medical services until other third party resources, such
as available health or casualty insurance, have been fully exhausted.40
California's implementation of these requirements gives rise to the
present controversy in this area, since the impact of these requirements
on the provider community has been economically undesirable and le-
gally open to question.
Federal law reqh.ires states participating in the Medicaid program to
take all reasonable measures to ascertain the legal liability of third par-
ties for Medicaid covered services.4 Specifically, states are to treat this
legal liability as a resource of the individual42 and seek reimbursement
when legal liability is found to exist after medical assistance has been
made available through the program.43 Federal regulations refer to
any entity that is or may be liable to pay all or part of the medical cost
of the injury, disease, or disability of a Medicaid applicant or recipient
as a liable third party.44
In implementing this federal requirement, California chose not to re-
fer to all legal liability for medical services as strictly third party liabil-
ity.41 Instead, the State separated the concept into two distinct
35. 42 U.S.C. §1396 (1976 & Supp. 11 1979).
36. 42 U.S.C. §1396a (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
37. 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(25) (1976).
38. .1d
39. See 22 CAL. ADM. CODE §§50771, 51005; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§14023, 14024,
14124.70-14124.79.
40. 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(25) (1976); see 22 CAL. ADM. CODE §§50771, 51005; CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE §§14023, 14024, 14124.70-14124.79.
41. 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(25) (1976).
42. Id
43. 1d
44. 42 C.F.R. §433.135 (1980).
45. Comare CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§14023, 14024 with Id §§14124.70-14124.79. See
generally Post Trial Brief for Defendant, Palumbo v. Myers, No. 287983 (Super. Ct., Sacramento,
1981).
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categories: "other coverage" and "third party liability."'  Other cover-
age is defined as contractual or legal entitlements to health care services
existing at the time the recipient obtained the medical services.47 Third
party liability refers only to potential liability in tort.48 The State
makes the distinction between the terms "other coverage" and "third
party liability" purportedly because the State believes that the federal
statutory language is extremely general and requires specificity.49
Moreover, the State claims the existence of other coverage bars the re-
cipient from Medi-Cal eligibility as to the covered service,5" whereas
the existence of potential third party liability only gives the State a
right to indemnification while the recipient remains covered by Medi-
Cal.5 t
The intent of the State to distinguish between these two characteriza-
tions of liability is exemplified by separate provisions in the Welfare
and Institutions Code for "other coverage" and "third party liability."
Sections 14023 and 14024 of the Welfare and Institutions Code refer to
"other coverage." Section 14023 makes it a misdemeanor for a recipi-
ent who has or acquires any other contractual or legal -entitlement to
any health care service to fail to disclose and to fail to use and exhaust
such other entitlements.52  Section 14024 provides that when health
care services are provided to a person under this program, who at the
time the service is provided has any other contractual or legal entitle-
ments to the services, the director may recover either the amount that
would have been paid to the person or the reasonable value of the
53services.s
46. Compare CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§14023, 14024 with id §§14124.70-14124.79.
47. 22 CAL. ADM. CODE §51005.
48. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§14124.70-14124.79.
49. See Post Trial Brief for Defendant, Palumbo v. Myers, No. 287983, at 8-10 (Super. Ct.,
Sacramento, 1981).
50. Id at 9.
51. Id
52. California Welfare and Institutions Code Section 14023 provides:
(a) Any applicant for public assistance or coverage under this chapter who at the time
of application has any other contractual or legal entitlement to any health care service
defined in Section 14053, and who wilfully fails at that time to disclose the fact of such
other entitlement, or falsely represents that he does not have such other entitlement, is
guilty of a misdemeanor.
(b) Any public assistance recipient or person eligible under this chapter who, subse-
quent to the date of application for such assistance or coverage under this chapter, ac-
quires any other contractual or legal entitlement to any health care service defined in
Section 14053, and wilfully fails or refuses to give notice thereof to his county welfare
department within 10 days of such acquisition, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
(c) Any public assistance recipient or person eligible under this chapter who has any
other contractual or legal entitlement to any health care service defined in Section 14053,
and who knowing that he must use such entitlement first, obtains any such service under
Medi-Cal without first having utilized and exhausted his other contractual or legal enti-
tlement thereto or therefor, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
53. California Welfare and Institutions Code Section 14024 provides:
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Welfare and Institutions Code Sections 14124.70-14124.79 contain
the provisions relating to "third party liability." These sections do not
require the beneficiary to use third party liability first, nor do they re-
quire a provider to bill persons potentially liable in tort. This distinc-
tion between "other coverage" and "third party liability" has a limiting
effect on the provider's ability to receive the usual and customary fee
for his or her services. The following section will analyze the rationale
of the State for this distinction and will discuss why the result is unfa-
vorable to providers.
MEDI-CAL'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN OTHER COVERAGE AND THIRD
PARTY LIABILITY: AN INCONSISTENT RESULT
Federal law requires the state to limit provider participation in the
program to those providers who accept Medicaid's fee schedule as pay-
ment in full.54 The law prohibits providers from billing the beneficiary
or any other person a fee in excess of the rates established by the
state.55 Thus, in compliance with federal law, California requires prov-
iders to accept Medi-Cal payment as payment in full for Medi-Cal cov-
ered services. 6 Providers are specifically prohibited from "balance
billing '57 the beneficiary or anyone else. 8
A. Other Coverage
While the law in California prohibits the provider from receiving
payment from sources other than the program,5 9 Section 14019.4 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code carves out an exception to this prohibi-
tion. This code section allows providers to bill third party payers who
provide a contractual or legal entitlement to health care services.60 The
When health care services are provided to a person under this chapter who at the time
the service is provided has any other contractual or legal entitlement to such services, the
director shall have the right to recover from the person, corporation, or partnership who
owes such entitlement, the amount which would have been paid to the person entitled
thereto, or to a third party in his behalf, or the value of the service actually provided, if
the person entitled thereto was entitled to services. The Attorney General may, to re-
cover under this section, institute and prosecute legal proceedings against the person,
corporation, or partnership owing such entitlement in the appropriate court in the name
of the director.
54. 42 C.F.R. §447.15 (1980); see 42 U.S.C. §1396h(d) (Supp. III 1979).
55. 42 U.S.C. §1396h(d) (Supp. 111 1979).
56. See 22 CAL. ADM. CODE §§51002, 51471; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§14019.3, 14019.4.
57. See note 8 supra.
58. 22 CAL. ADM. CODE §§51005, 51471.
59. See 22 CAL. ADM. CODE §§51002, 51471; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§14019.3, 14019.4.
60. Section 14019.4 of the Welfare and Institutions Code specifically states in pertinent part:
(a) Any provider of health care services who obtains a label or copy from the Medi-Cal
card or other proof of eligibility pursuant to this chapter shall not seek reimbursement
nor attempt to obtain payment for the cost of such covered health care services from the
eligible applicant or rec4iient, or anyperson other than the department or thirdpartypayer
who provides a contractual or legal entitlement to health care services.
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provider has the option of billing Medi-Cal or billing the other in-
surer.6 ' If the provider bills the other insurer, and the insurer pays
more than Medi-Cal, the provider may retain the entire amount. If the
provider bills only the Medi-Cal program, and the program subse-
quently bills the other insurer, the provider may receive additional
funds.62 This would occur if the other insurer paid Medi-Cal more for
a particular procedure than Medi-Cal had previously paid to the pro-
vider. In this case, the Medi-Cal program would be required to pay the
excess of any amount received from the other insurer to the provider,
up to the amount the provider billed the program.63
The question arises as to how this statutory exception overcomes fed-
eral law that specifically states that the provider is prohibited from this
practice.64 The rationale of the State for this exception was recently
articulated 65 in the trial court case of Palumbo v. Myers.66" In the de-
fendant State's post trial brief, the California Attorney General rea-
soned that, given the federal law on this matter and California's
exception, one of two conclusions must be reached,67 either: (1) the
State is not in compliance with the federal law;68 or (2) allowing a pro-
vider to bill other contractual or legal entitlements when Medi-Cal has
been fully reimbursed is not the type of billing federal law prohibits.69
The brief stated that this exception is consistent with federal law
since a person who had full coverage for the services received was obli-
gated to use the other coverage before Medi-Cal paid for the services.70
In addition, although the determination of eligibility for these services
obviously is made retroactively, this result is nevertheless compelled by
federal law which requires other coverage to be treated as a resource
(emphasis added).
61. The California Department of Health Services has interpreted Section 14019.3 of the
California Welfare and Institutions Code and Sections 51005 and 51471 of Title 22, California
Administrative Code, as allowing the provider the option of billing either Medi-Cal or the other
coverage. Under no circumstances, however, is the provider allowed to bill Medi-Cal and the
other coverage simultaneously. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES, MEDI-CAL
BULLETIN No. 106 (Nov. 1979).
62. Notice of Intended Decision & Memorandum Opinion, Palumbo v. Myers, No. 287983
(Super. Ct., Sacramento, 1981). The court stated that the parties agreed that a provider is entitled
to recover the difference between the usual fee and the Medi-Cal allotment when the Medi-Cal
beneficiary has other insurance which pays for Medi-Cal coverage.
63. 22 CAL. ADM. CODE §51005(d).
64. See 42 U.S.C. §1396h(d) (Supp. III 1979).
65. Post Trial Brief for Defendant, Palumbo v. Myers, No. 287983 (Super. Ct., Sacramento,
1981).
66. Palumbo v. Myers, No. 287983 (Super. Ct., Sacramento, 1981).
67. Post Trial Brief for Defendant, Palumbo v. Myers, No. 287983 at 7 (Super. Ct., Sacra-
mento, 1981).
68. Id The Attorney General stressed that, to reach this conclusion, would lead to termina-
tion of federal funding for Medi-Cal. Id
69. Id
70. Id at 7-9.
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barring eligibility.7 1 Further, state law requires other coverage to be
used first.72 Thus, once the Medi-Cal program has been reimbursed by
the other insurer, the medical bills have actually been paid for by an-
other insurer source and not by the Medi-Cal program.73
B. Third Party Liability
Although providers are allowed to bill other insurers under the
above exception, this has not been interpreted to mean that providers
are allowed to also bill liable third parties. The State makes a clear
distinction between "other coverage" and "third party liability" thus
when a Medi-Cal beneficiary receives a judgment or settlement in a tort
action, his or her providers are prohibited from receiving any compen-
sation from the judgment or settlement proceeds for the difference be-
tween the amount charged and the amount actually paid by Medi-
Cal,7 4 even though the State has been reimbursed in accordance with
Sections 14124.70-14124.79 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
The State argues that an exception similar to the exception for "other
coverage" would not be proper in the case of a tort recovery since the
inherent qualities found with contractual liability of other coverage are
lacking in the case of "contingent" third party liability.75 Specifically,
the potential right to a tort recovery does not bar Medi-Cal eligibility to
services. 76 Further, the potential liability cannot be treated as a re-
source or be required to be used first since it is inchoate.77 Also, in the
overwhelming majority of tort cases involving Medi-Cal beneficiaries,
the State does not recover the full amount of its lien for tort-related
medical care, and therefore, the Medi-Cal program still pays for part of
the beneficiary's medical services. 78 The State claims that once it has
been reimbursed from the other insurer, it is no longer involved with
the services.79 The State, however, fails to explain how its rationale
allows the provider to bill both the other insurer and Medi-Cal in a
situation when the other insurer's payment for a service is less than
Medi-Cal's. In this case, the provider would be able to keep the pay-
ment from the other insurer and bill Medi-Cal for the difference, up to
71. Id at 12.
72. Id; see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §14019.3.
73. See note 67 smupra.
74. Post Trial Brief for Defendant, Palumbo v. Myers, No. 287983 at 12 (Super. Ct., Sacra-
mento, 1981).
75. Id at 13.
76. Id
77. Id
78. Id
79. See id at 14.
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the fee schedule allowed by Medi-Cal. It appears that Medi-Cal would
continue to be involved with the payment for services in this situation.
The State further supports the distinction with various policy consid-
erations.8 0 The State claims the prohibition against balance billing or
billing the liable third party in a tort recovery is necessary to protect the
beneficiary from undue influence and pressure by creditors, including
physicians."1 Further, the State believes that physicians may refuse to
treat a patient who does not agree to sue an alleged tortfeasor8 2 or agree
to pay the full fee upon acquiring a settlement.8 3 In addition, the phy-
sician who seeks funds from the tortfeasor's insurer may compete with
the beneficiary for limited settlement proceeds.' This last argument
seems ironic since a provider may bill any other insurance the benefici-
ary may have had at the time of the accident, and if that other insurer
has subrogation rights, the insurer will place a lien on the beneficiary's
tort settlement, thus competing with the beneficiary for the settlement
proceeds and defeating this policy interest.
The state appears to have ignored the fact that any tort judgment or
settlement will be based on the judicial principles of tort liability and
damages, thereby ensuring that the medical bills of a wrongfully in-
jured person are paid for by the liable third party. Furthermore, the
value that the judicial system places on the medical services may be
significantly different from the value Medi-Cal has placed on the same
services since the policy considerations of each system are not the
same. s5 Thus, to allow the Medi-Cal program to limit the amount a
provider may receive in this situation effectively permits Medi-Cal to
dictate judicial policy. This concept becomes more apparent when
viewing a hypothetical situation in which the theory of tort law is
brought into play.
MEDI-CAL'S THIRD PARTY LIABILITY LAW IN RELATION
TO TORT LAW
The impact and unjustness of the exclusion by the State of third
party liability cases from balance billing86 can be examined by consid-
ering the following hypothetical:
80. Id
81. Id
82. Id
83. Id
84. Id
85. See generally Morris v. Williams, 67 Cal. 2d 773, 749, 433 P.2d 697, 708, 63 Cal. Rptr.
689, 700 (1967); California Ass'n of Nursing Homes Inc. v. Williams, 4 Cal. App. 3d 800, 817, 84
Cal. Rptr. 590, 602 (1970); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§14000, 14000.1, 14075, 14078, 14079,
14105; Rate Development, supra note 20. See note 90 infra.
86. See note 8 supra.
1075
Paciflc Law Journal / Vol 13
A Medi-Cal beneficiary is injured by a third party. The beneficiary
receives services from a Medi-Cal provider. The provider bills the
Medi-Cal program for the services provided. Medi-Cal pays for the
services based on the Medi-Cal fee schedule. Subsequently, the ben-
eficiary receives a tort recovery from the liable third party.
To demonstrate how California's treatment of third party liability
interferes with basic tort law and the underlying policy considerations,
two questions of prime importance concerning this fact pattern must be
asked: (1) What measure of damages was used to compute the special
damages,8 7 Le., medical expenses; and (2) Which parties are entitled to
receive compensation from the proceeds?
A. Measure of Damages
A principal element of damages in a personal injury action is the
value of medical services.88 Generally, the plaintiff may recover as spe-
cial damages89 the reasonable value of the medical services made nec-
essary by the injury.9" Special damages may include the value of
medicines and medical attendance, 91 hospital services,92 and care and
nursing.93 Recovery for medical attendance and nursing is usually con-
trolled by the reasonable worth of the services94 and not by the amount
actually paid or contracted to be paid.95 Normally, the reasonable
worth is established by introducing expert testimony that the amount of
the bill, or the value of the service, is reasonable in view of the services
performed.96
87. Medical expenses are special damages that must be specifically pleaded. Large v. Wil-
liams, 154 Cal. App. 2d 315, 320, 315 P.2d 919, 923 (1957); Sills v. Soto, 124 Cal. App. 2d 539, 545-
46, 269 P.2d 98, 102 (1954).
88. 154 Cal. App. 2d at 320,315 P.2d at 923; 124 Cal. App. 2d at 545-46, 269 P.2d at 102. See
notes 91, 93 infra.
89. See note 85 supra.
90. District of Columbia v. Woodbury, 136 U.S. 450, 466 (1890); Herrick v. Sayer, 160 F.
Supp. 25, 29 (N.D. Ind. 1958); Trotter v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 645, 649-50 (W.D. La. 1951);
Melone v. Sierra R. Co., 151 Cal. 113, 115, 91 P. 522, 523 (1907); Guerra v. Balestrieri, 127 Cal.
App. 2d 511, 520, 274 P.2d 443, 448 (1954); Townsend v. Keith, 34 Cal. App. 564, 565, 168 P. 402,
403 (1917); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §924 (1977).
91. Vicksburg & M.R. Co. v. Putnam, 118 U.S. 545, 554 (1886); 154 Cal. App. 2d at 320, 315
P.2d at 923.
92. 160 F. Supp. at 30; 95 F. Supp. at 49-50.
93. 154 Cal. App. 2d at 320, 315 P.2d at 923; Tomey v. Dyson, 76 Cal. App. 2d 212, 221-22,
172 P.2d 739, 744 (1946).
94. See note 88 supra.
95. Evidence as to what was actually paid for medication is competent, but failure to prove
by further testimony the reasonableness of the payment constitutes a failure of proof which will
render immaterial the proof of what was actually paid. Ross v. Foss, 77 S.D. 358, 366-67, 92
N.W.2d 147, 152 (1958); Klingman v. Fish & Hunter Co., 19 S.D. 139, 147-48, 102 N.W. 601, 603
(1905); The proper measure of damages is the reasonable value of such services, not the amount
paid or incurred therefore, although the amount paid or incurred would be some evidence of the
value. 127 Cal. App. 2d at 520, 274 P.2d at 448; 34 Cal. App. at 565, 168 P. at 403.
96. L. JOHNS, CALIFORNIA DAMAoES LAW & PROOF 22 (2d ed. 1977).
1076
1982 / Medi- Cal
1. Does the Medi-Cal fee schedule reflect the reasonable value of
the services?
Under federal law, the amount of payment to a provider of services
under the state97 medical assistance program is largely within the dis-
cretion of the state, subject to provisions of the Social Security Act and
Medicaid regulations.9" A state is not required to establish minimum
payment rates to providers99 but is only required not to exceed certain
upper limits of payment. °0 The state must, however, be cognizant that
the payment rates should be adequate to attract a sufficient number of
qualified providers to ensure "mainstream" medical care to Medicaid
beneficiaries. 1 '
The California Welfare and Institutions Code Section 14075102 states
that it is the intent of the Legislature, to the extent feasible and permit-
ted by federal law, that physicians should be reimbursed equally state
wide for comparable services at a rate sufficient to provide Medi-Cal
recipients with reasonable access to medical care. In September 1976,
the Legislature established a new statewide uniform reimbursement
method to pay for Medi-Cal physician services. °3 The California De-
partment of Health Services was directed to review annually"° physi-
cian reimbursement rates under this new method and to report to the
Legislature each January on the results of this review. 0 5 The most cur-
rent report, dated January 1981, reveals that the Medi-Cal level of pay-
ment is strikingly lower than other third party payers for 21 common
procedures. 0 6 The report states in relevant part:
The Medicare maximum allowances for Los Angeles County are
on the average approximately 70% greater than the Medi-Cal maxi-
mums. The minimum fee schedule used by the California Division
of Industrial Accidents for remuneration of physicians who treat in-
dustrial injuries under the workers' compensation laws is approxi-
mately 70% higher than the Medi-Cal fee schedule.
California Blue Shield declined to provide data for this report re-
garding their payment levels. However, their average reimbursement
97. Hempstead General Hosp. v. Whalen, 474 F. Supp. 398, (E.D.N.Y. 1975); 42 U.S.C.
§1396a (1976 & Supp. III 1980); 42 C.F.R. §§447.200-447.273, 447.301-447.316, 447.325-447.334,
447.341-447.371 (1980).
98. See note 97 supra.
99. See note 97 supra.
100. A particular limit is that Medicaid reimbursement may not exceed Medicare reimburse-
ment. See note 97 supra.
101. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §14075 (added by CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1207, §2, at 5494).
102. Id
103. Id
104. Id §14079 (added by CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1207, §2.5, at 5496).
105. Id
106. REPORT TO THE GovERNoR, supra note 6, at 6.
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level is presumably the actual charge since their reimbursement pol-
icy is to pay "usual, customary, and reasonable". The maximum
payment levels for the United Foundations for Medical Care under
their contract with the Public Employees Retirement System are
about double the l4edi-Cal reimbursement levels.107
This report clearly shows that Medi-Cal payments are substantially
lower than payments by other third party payers.108
Since the rates paid by Medi-Cal are much lower than other third
party payers,10 9 it follows that the amount of tort recovery allocated to
medical expenses would be far greater than Medi-Cal actually paid
since damages are based on "reasonable" value.110 In fact, the amount
allocated' should be closer to the amount charged, provided the
amount charged is reasonable. Under the current interpretation of the
law by the State, the beneficiary is only obligated to reimburse the state
for the amount it actually paid. Some may argue that the plaintiff's
medical expenses should be reduced to the amount actually owed to the
state." 2 To do otherwise would allow the beneficiary to be unjustly
enriched since he or she would be better off financially than before the
injury." 3
2. May the Value of the Medical Damages be Reduced Because
Plaintffis not Personally Obligated to Pay for the
Services?
Courts generally have held that benefits received by a plaintiff from
a source wholly independent of and collateral to the wrongdoer will not
diminish the damages otherwise recoverable from the wrongdoer. 4
This is known as the "collateral source rule."'" 5 The Supreme Court of
107. REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR, s.upra note 6, at 6.
108. REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR, supra note 6, at 5.
109. REPORT TO THE GOvERNOR, supra note 6, at 5.
110. See note 90supra.
111. If the medical expenses are stipulated by the attorneys, the basis of the stipulation should
not be the actual Medi-Cal payment, but, rather, should reflect the reasonable value of the serv-
ices. Cf. District of Columbia v. Woodbury, 136 U.S. 450, 466 (1890); Herrick v. Sayer, 160 F.
Supp. 25, 29 (N.D. Ind. 1958); Melone v. Sierra R. Co., 151 Cal. 113, 115, 115 P.2d 522, 523
(1907); Townsend v. Keith, 34 Cal. App. 564, 565, 168 P. 402, 403 (1917); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS §924 (1977). All of the above cited authorities state that damages are to be
awarded based on the reasonable value of the services. Therefore, if the attorneys choose to stipu-
late to this issue, thereby taking the determination of damages away from the factfinder, they too
should base their stipulation amount on the reasonable value of the services.
112. See generally Sedler, The Collateral Source Rule andPersonal njury Damages: The Irrel-
evant Princile and the FunctionalApproach, 58 Ky. L.J. 161, 161-78 (1979).
113. Id
114. See City of Salinas v. Souza & McCue Constr. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 217, 226, 424 P.2d 921,
925, 57 Cal. Rptr. 337, 341 (1967); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Starley, 28 Cal. 2d 347, 349, 170 P.2d
448,450 (1946); Peri v. Los Angeles Junction R. Co., 22 Cal. 2d 111, 131, 137 P.2d 441, 452 (1943);
see also Lewis v. County of Contra Costa, 130 Cal. App. 2d 176, 178, 278 P.2d 756, 758 (1955).
115. See note 114 supra.
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California has long adhered to this doctrine."1 6 The California courts,
however, have not specifically ruled on the applicability of the collat-
eral source rule when the benefit received is Medi-Cal. Nevertheless,
the courts have decided similar issues which provide some indication of
their posture on this matter.
a. Independent Collateral Sources
In Hefend v. Southern California Rapid Transit,"7 the California
Supreme Court reaffirmed its adherence to the collateral source rule in
tort cases in which the plaintiff had been compensated by an independ-
ent collateral source such as insurance, pension, continued wages, or
disability insurance for which the plaintiff had actually or construc-
tively paid." 18 The Court went on to state that the collateral source rule
also applied in cases in which the collateral source would be recom-
pensed from the tort recovery through subrogation, refund of benefits,
or some other arrangement." 19 In a footnote in this case, 120 the court
stated that there were many sorts of collateral sources and a great vari-
ety of contexts in which the rule might be applied. In considering
Hefend, however, the court stated that it was not determining the ap-
propriateness of the application of the rule in the myriad of possible
solutions which were not presented by the facts of the particular
case. '21
While the California courts have not specifically ruled on the appli-
cability of the collateral source rule when the collateral source is Medi-
Cal payments, the language in Helfend supports the application of the
rule in this situation since the beneficiary is obligated by statute' 22 to
reimburse the State if he or she recovers payment from a third party.12 3
Further, several other states have specifically ruled on this matter and
have determined that the rule does apply when the collateral source is
Medicaid payments, 124 and as a result, evidence that the Medicaid pro-
gram has paid for the plaintiff's medical expenses is not admissible. 125
The Fourth Appellate District in California addressed a somewhat
116. Helfand v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit, 2 Cal. 3d 1, 6, 465 P.2d 61, 63, 84 Cal. Rptr. 173,
175 (1970); De Cruz v. Reid, 69 Cal. 2d 217, 223-27, 444 P.2d 342, 346-49, 65 Cal. Rptr. 698, 701-
03 (1968).
117. 2 Cal. 3d 1, 465 P.2d 61, 84 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1970).
118. Id at 13-14, 465 P.2d at 69, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 181.
119. Id
120. Id at 6 n.3, 465 P.2d at 63 n.3, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 175 n.3.
121. Id
122. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§14124.70-14124.79.
123. Id
124. Bennet v. Haley, 132 Ga. App. 512, 523-25, 208 S.E.2d 302, 310-12 (1974); see Gomez v.
Black, 32 Colo. App. 332, 336, 511 P.2d 531, 533 (1973).
125. See note 124 supra.
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similar matter in Reichle v. Hazie.126 In Reichle, the defendant at-
tacked the award of special damages because the plaintiff was
treated 127 in a county hospital that charged according to the patient's
ability to pay. The county hospital, however, had a policy of requiring
the patient to pay the reasonable value of the services if the person
received payment from a third party for the injuries treated. 128 The
court held that the plaintiff was entitled to an award of special damages
to cover the reasonable charge for his care and services. 129 The court
noted that if the patient had been treated in a private hospital there
would have been no question that the patient should receive the rea-
sonable value of the services provided.' 30 Therefore, merely because
the patient received the care in a county hospital with a reduced rate
structure was held not to be a sufficient reason for reducing special
damages below the reasonable value of similar services. 3 ' The court
further stated that since a recovery for services provided by a private
hospital, which went to increase their profits, was permitted, there was
as strong a reason to allow a similar recovery to a public institution
when the money would relieve the burden of public taxes. 132
An analogy to the court's comparison of public and private hospitals
would be a comparison between Medi-Cal and private medical insur-
ance. Since the collateral source rule applies to allow private insurance
to be reimbursed, 133 no valid reason exists not to apply the rule to allow
reimbursement to the publicly funded Medi-Cal program. Any money
received by the program would go to relieve the burden of publicly
financed health care.' Further, in Reichle attention was called to the
fact that the plaintiff was under an obligation to repay the county hos-
pital for services provided if the patient received funds from a liable
third party.' 35 A similar situation exists under Medi-Cal. The benefici-
ary is obligated by statute136 to reimburse the State for any benefits
provided when the beneficiary receives payment from a liable third
party. Given the above similarities between Reichle and Medi-Cal, the
court could apply the rationale of the Reichle decision and reach a sim-
126. 22 Cal. App. 2d 543, 71 P.2d 849 (1937).
127. Id at 547-48, 71 P.2d at 850-51.
128. Id
129. Id
130. Id
131. Id
132. Id
133. See note 116 supra.
134. Since Medi-Cal is a publicly funded health care program, any funds recovered by the
program would decrease the burden on the public. See Morris v. Williams, 67 Cal. 2d 733, 749,
433 P.2d 697, 708, 63 Cal. Rptr. 689, 700 (1967); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§10020, 14000,
14000.1, 14124.70-14124.79.
135. 22 Cal. App. 2d at 547, 71 P.2d at 850-51.
136. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§14124.70-14124.79.
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ilar holding in a Medi-Cal case. 137 A further indication that a Califor-
nia court will apply the collateral source rule for Medi-Cal payments is
exemplified by the Third District Court of Appeal's recent interpreta-
tion of section 3333.1 of the California Civil Code.
b. California Civil Code Section 3333.1
The court's interpretation of Section 3333.1 was articulated in Brown
v. Stewart 38 that involved a suit for medical malpractice. The plain-
tiffs medical benefits had been paid for by the Medi-Cal program. 139
The defendant wanted to introduce this fact into evidence so that the
jury might reduce the damages by that amount. 4 ' In California, the
measure of damages in a tort action is governed by section 3333 of the
Civil Code.' 4 ' This code section provides that the amount of damages,
except when otherwise expressly provided by this code, is the amount
that will compensate for all the detriment proximately caused thereby,
whether it could have been anticipated or not.' 42 Nevertheless, section
3333.1 of the Civil Code specifically allows a defendant, in an action
for personal injury against a health care provider based upon profes-
sional negligence, to introduce evidence of some of the amounts paya-
ble to plaintiff as a result of the personal injury, for the purpose of
reducing the special damages.1 43 For an amount payable to be intro-
duced, it must have been made pursuant to one of the following: the
U.S. Social Security Act; any state or federal income disability insur-
ance; accident insurance that provides health care benefits or income
disability coverage; or any contract or agreement of any group to pro-
vide, pay for, or reimburse the cost of health care services. 144 Thus,
section 3333.1 of the Civil Code becomes an exception to the collateral
source rule by specifically allowing into evidence, for the purpose of
reducing damages, the fact that the health services were paid for by a
third party.
In Brown, the question presented was whether medical benefits paid
by the Medi-Cal program came under the purview of this statute.1 45
137. See 22 Cal. App. 2d at 547-48, 71 P.2d at 851.
138. 121 Cal. App. 3d 649, 175 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1981).
139. Id at 651, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
140. See id at 658-59, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 518-20.
141. California Civil Code Section 3333 provides:
For the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, the measure of damages, ex-
cept where otherwise expressly provided by this Code, is the amount which will compen-
sate for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could have been
anticipated or not.
142. Id
143. CAL. Cw. CODE §3333.1.
144. Id
145. 121 Cal. App. 3d, at 653-54, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 517.
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The court held that only those benefits specified in the statute were
affected.1 46 Since Medi-Cal payments were not made by any of the
organizations listed in the statute, evidence of Medi-Cal payment could
not be used to reduce the damages. 47 In Brown, the court was not
willing to permit Medi-Cal payments into evidence under a statute that
specifically allowed certain types of payments to be introduced. It
seems logical to infer that absent a statiite that specifically allows evi-
dence of payment by Medi-Cal to be introduced, the court would be
unwilling to permit this type of evidence to be admitted.
Based on the principles of Helfand, Reichle, and Brown, 48 if a case
were to come before a court in California regarding the applicability of
the collateral source rule to Medi-Cal payments, the courts would un-
doubtedly apply the rule. Evidence of Medi-Ca's payment for the
medical services would therefore be excluded and the plaintiff's special
damages could not be reduced by any amount attributable to Medi-
Cal's payment. When a lien is subsequently placed on the tort recovery
by the State for services paid by Medi-Cal, adequate funds should be
available to cover the lien. Furthermore, if the recovery were based on
the reasonable value of the services, an additional amount of money
allocated to the medical expenses should be remaining, ie., the differ-
ence between the reasonable value of the service and the Medi-Cal lien.
An area of disagreement arises regarding which individuals should be
allowed to receive payment from this recovery. The next section will
discuss who is entitled to reimbursement from the tort recovery under
the current application of the law.
B. Who is entitled to receive compensation from the damages?
Sections 14124.70-14124.79 of the California Welfare and Institu-
tions Code provide that the California Department of Health Services
has a right, in the case of injury by a tortfeasor to a Medi-Cal benefici-
ary, to sue the tortfeasor directly, join in the beneficiary's action, or
place a lien on the proceeds. 149 When the Medi-Cal beneficiary re-
ceives a tort recovery, he or she must therefore reimburse the State for
any tort-related services for which the Medi-Cal program paid, pro-
146. Id at 658, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 518-19.
147. See id
148. See Helfand v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit, 2 Cal. 3d 1, 465 P.2d 61, 84 Cal. Rptr. 173
(1970); Brown v. Stewart, 121 Cal. App. 3d 649, 175 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1981); Reichle v. Hazie, 22
Cal. App. 2d 543, 71 P.2d 849 (1937).
149. California St. Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Jackson, 9 Cal. 3d 859, 866-68, 512 P.2d
1201, 1208, 109 Cal. Rptr. 297, 304 (1973); Wright v. Department of Benefit Payments, 90 Cal.
App. 3d 446, 449, 153 Cal. Rptr. 474, 476 (1979); Brian v. Christensen, 35 Cal. App. 3d 377, 380,
110 Cal. Rptr. 688, 690 (1973); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§14124.70-14124.79.
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vided the State places a timely lien on the recovery.1 50
Under Section 14124.74 of the California Welfare and Institutions
Code, the beneficiary is required only to reimburse the State for the
amount of the benefits actually paid on behalf of the beneficiary.151
Since Medi-Cal's payment rate for medical services is far below the
reasonable value of the services,' 52 and a beneficiary's settlement for
medical expenses should be based on the reasonable value of the serv-
ices,1 53 excess funds will remain after the State is reimbursed. 154 The
question of who is entitled to receive the difference between the reason-
able value of the services provided and Medi-Cal fees is currently
disputed. 55
According to the interpretation of Section 14019.4 by the State, the
provider of services is prevented from accepting payment for services,
except from another insurer, after he or she has billed Medi-Cal. 56
Thus, the provider would be prohibited from receiving additional
funds from a tort recovery.'57 The beneficiary would therefore be enti-
tled to keep the "excess" medical payments as well as any general dam-
ages.158 The interpretation by the State of this statute was recently
tested in two cases.' 59
Winter v. Gnaizda 160 involved a minor child injured in an automobile
accident. The minor received medical services from a provider who
billed and was subsequently reimbursed by the Medi-Cal program.16'
The claimant's attorney recovered insurance proceeds under an unin-
sured motorist claim. The provider then submitted a bill to the attor-
ney and his client for the difference between the amount charged in the
original bill and the sum paid by Medi-Cal.162 Before honoring the
150. See note 148 supra.
151. California Welfare & Institutions Code Section 14124.74(a) states in part:
[alfter payment of such expenses and attorney's fees the court or agency shall, on the
application of the director, allow as a first lien against the amount of such judgment or
award, the amount of the director's expenditures for the benefit of the beneficiary under
the Medi-Cal Program, as provided in subdivision (d) of Section 14124.72.
152. REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR, supra note 6, at 6.
153. See note 90 supra.
154. Compare REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR, supra note 6, at 6 with District of Columbia v.
Woodbury, 136 U.S. 450, 466, (1890); Herrick v. Sayer, 160 F. Supp. 25, 29 (N.D. Ind. 1958);
Trotter v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 645, 649-50 (N.D. La. 1951); Melone v. Sierra R. Co., 151
Cal. 131, 115, 91 P. 522, 523 (1907); Guerra v. Balestrieri, 127 Cal. App. 2d 511, 520, 274 P.2d 443,
448 (1954); Townsend v. Keith, 34 Cal. App. 564, 565, 168 P. 402, 403 (1917); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF ToRTs §924 (1977).
155. See text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
156. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
157. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
158. See 22 CAL. ADM. CODE §51471(a)(1). See note 16 supra.
159. Winter v. Gnaizda, 90 Cal. App. 3d. 750, 152 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1979); Palumbo v. Myers,
No. 287983 (Super. Ct., Sacramento, 1981).
160. 90 Cal. App. 3d. 750, 152 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1979).
161. Id. at 753-54, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 703.
162. Id
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bill, the attorney contacted Blue Shield, the fiscal intermediary for
Medi-Cal, and was told that the physician was not entitled to any addi-
tional amounts.163 The provider sought declaratory relief.' 64 The trial
court held the provider was entitled to recover the difference between
his full fee and the lesser amount paid under the Medi-Cal program. 65
A contrary holding was reached in Palumbo v. Myers. 66 In Palumbo,
a provider treated a patient for injuries suffered in an automobile acci-
dent.' 67 The provider billed the Medi-Cal program and was paid in
accordance with Medi-Cal's reduced fee schedule. Thereafter the pa-
tient filed a suit that was subsequently settled. Included in the settle-
ment was $3,739.00 allocated for medical services rendered by Dr.
Palumbo. Of that sum, $217.87 was paid to Medi-Cal to reimburse the
program. Dr. Palumbo was given a check for $1,567.13 by the patient's
attorney, that amount being the difference between his usual and cus-
tomary fee and the Medi-Cal allotment. 68 The provider did not cash
the check, stating that to do so would violate the Welfare and Institu-
tions Code Section 14019.4 and Title 22 California Administrative
Code Sections 51005 and 51471.169 Dr. Palumbo sought declaratory
relief from the court. 7 ° The court held that the reference to contrac-
tual or legal entitlement contained in Section 14019.4 did not encom-
pass the concept of third party liability, and thus additional recovery
would not be allowed.' 7' The provider could not recover the difference
between his usual and customary fee and the Medi-Cal payment from
the proceeds of a personal injury suit won or settled by the patient.'72
This case is presently under appeal.
The current state of the law is unsettled. The State contends that a
provider may not accept additional payment from a tort recovery after
he or she has accepted payment by Medi-Cal 7 3 The trial courts are in
disagreement as to the application of the law. A major problem with
the current interpretation by the State of the law is that it sharply devi-
ates from the general theory of tort law and damages.
163. Id
164. Id
165. Id
166. Palumbo v. Myers, No. 287983 (Super. Ct., Sacramento, 1981).
167. Id
168. Notice of Intended Decision & Memorandum Opinion, Palumbo v. Myers, No. 287983
(Super. Ct., Sacramento, 1981) at 1-2.
169. Id
170. Id
171. Id at 3-6.
172. Id
173. See note 16 supra.
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DEROGATION OF THE THEORY OF TORT DAMAGES
BY MEDI-CAL
Medi-Cal law in the area of third party liability does not adhere to
the general theory of tort damages."' 4 The law of tort damages is based
on the principle that a person injured by a wrongful or negligent act of
another shall be justly compensated to a degree commensurate with the
injury sustained." 5 Compensation is the stated goal of the courts in
awarding damages for tortious injury.176 Compensation most often
takes the form of restoring the plaintiff to the same position he or she
was in prior to the tort. 177
The plaintiff's recovery is usually limited to a fair compensation and
indemnity for the injury sustained.' 78 When a person is injured by a
liable third party and incurs medical bills, usually the award of special
damages for the reasonable value of the services justly compensates the
individual for the financial loss sustained. 7 9 The individual will
merely pay the medical bills or reimburse his or her medical insurance
plan under the subrogation clause of the contract. 80 This result is not
reached under the Medi-Cal program. Although the State has a statu-
tory right to reimbursement for payment of any medical bills,' 8' it has
denied the provider a right of subrogation or the ability to place a lien
on the beneficiary's settlement or judgment.'82 The result is that for
purposes of determining tort damages, the value of the medical services
will be determined in accordance with judicial criteria; but, when de-
termining what amount of the tort recovery will be distributed to per-
sons for payment of medical services provided, the value of the services
will be determined according to Medi-Cal's criteria.' 83 The problem
with this application is that the Medi-Cal value for the services is based
on certain policy considerations that are different from those of tort
174. The plaintiff is entitled to be placed in the same position financially that he or she would
have been in, if the injury in question had not been caused by the defendant. Dodds v. Buckman,
214 Cal. App. 2d 206, 212-213, 29 Cal. Rptr. 393, 396-97 (1963); Tremeroli v. Austin Trailer
Equip. Co., 102 Cal. App. 2d 464, 481, 227 P.2d 923, 934 (1951); CAL. CIV. CODE §3333.
175. See Coughlin v. Blair, 41 Cal. 2d 587, 600-01, 262 P.2d 305, 312-13 (1953); see also Avery
v. Fredericksen & Westbrook, 67 Cal. App. 334, 336-37, 154 P.2d 41, 42-44 (1944).
176. Castro v. Bass, 74 N.M. 254, 258, 392 P.2d 668, 671 (1964); see Peterson v. Bachar, 193
Kan. 161, 164, 392 P.2d 853, 855 (1973); Hughett v. Caldwell County, 313 Ky. 85, 91, 230 S.W.2d
92, 96 (1950).
177. See note 147 supra.
178. See note 90 supra.
179. See note 90 supra.
180. Helfand v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit, 2 Cal. 3d 1, 10, 465 P.2d 61, 67, 84 Cal. Rptr.
173, 179 (1970).
181. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§14124.70-14124.79.
182. See id §§14019.3, 14019.4. See note 16 supra.
183. See Morris v. Williams, 67 Cal. 2d 733, 749, 433 P.2d 697, 708, 63 Cal. Rptr. 689, 700
(1967); California Ass'n of Nursing Homes v. Williams, 4 Cal. App. 3d 800, 817, 84 Cal. Rptr. 590,
602 (1970); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§14000, 14000.1, 14075, 14078, 14079, 14105.
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damages.184 The Medi-Cal program is funded on revenues generated
by the state and federal government.8 5 Since this reserve is limited,
the program must take all precautions to contain the costs of the pro-
gram with the result being that providers' fees are not equal to the rea-
sonable value of the services.186 Providers, well aware of this fact,
agree to accept less money to perform the services. When Medi-Cal
pays for the medical services, the funds are coming from the govern-
ment; whereas, in the case of a tort recovery, the payment for the medi-
cal services are coming from the tortfeasor.
187
The value that the judicial system has placed on these services, for
the purposes of ascertaining damages, is the reasonable value of the
services. This is the value that the tortfeasor must pay. 188 A person
who is not eligible for Medi-Cal normally will be required to reimburse
his or her physician for the reasonable value of the services provided,
and therefore, any tort recovery received by the individual will be re-
duced accordingly. A Medi-Cal beneficiary, however, is only required
to reimburse the Medi-Cal program for the amount the program paid
the provider in accordance with its fee schedule. 89 Obviously, the
Medi-Cal beneficiary is obligated to pay lower medical bills than the
individual who is not on Medi-Cal due to the intervention by the State.
Nevertheless, the Medi-Cal beneficiary's special damages are based on
the reasonable value of the medical services provided. The State law
thus allows the beneficiary to keep the difference between the payment
by Medi-Cal and the reasonable value of the services. 190 The benefici-
ary ends up in a better financial position than before the injury since
the medical care was received free of charge, and the Department's lien
is approximately 50%-65% of the medical bills.191 The beneficiary,
therefore, is allowed to retain the other 35%-50%. Due to this inequita-
ble result between Medi-Cal beneficiaries and non-Medi-Cal benefi-
ciaries, any change in the cuirrent law to allow providers to receive
additional reimbursement from the proceeds of a tort recovery would
follow the general theory of tort damages and should be acceptable to
184. See note 183 supra.
185. See 67 Cal. 2d at 749, 433 P.2d at 708, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 700; California Medical Ass'n v.
Brian, 30 Cal. App. 3d 637, 642, 106 Cal. Rptr. 555, 558 (1973); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§§14000, 14000.1, 14124.70-14124.79; CAL. DEPT. OF HEALTH SERViCES, FACr BOOK ON HEALTH
CARE FOR THE POOR AND THE MEDI-CAL PROGRAM, v-4 (Apr. 1979).
186. See note 108 and accompanying text supra.
187. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
188. See note 90 supra.
189. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§14124.70-14124.79.
190. See notes 16 and 63 supra.
191. See REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR, supra note 6, at 6. See note 16 supra.
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the judiciary. 192
PROPOSED SOLUTION
The current situation could be resolved in two ways: (1) a court de-
cision which would set precedent in the area; or (2) an amendment to
the Welfare and Institutions Code, specifically allowing providers to
receive up to their full payment in the case of a tort recovery.
A. Judiciary
Resolving this issue by judicial fiat has the disadvantage of a poten-
tially undesirable result and a lengthy wait. The court may decide not
to allow this type of recovery under the current statute. The Legisla-
ture has addressed the issue of contractual or other legal entitlement to
medical care and third party liability in various provisions of the Wel-
fare and Institutions Code. 193 The State, in interpreting these sections
of legislation, has specifically differentiated between third party liabil-
ity and other coverage.194 To change the existing application of the law,
the court would have to find the longstanding State interpretation un-
reasonable and unsupported by policy grounds.195 The position of the
State is as follows:
The tortfeasor is not a "third party payor" as referenced in Section
14019.4 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. This term refers pri-
marily to public or private health insurance carriers with whom the
beneficiary has a policy of health insurance, or other forms of no-
fault health insurance held by others against which the beneficiary
could claim as a matter of right such as those contained in the "med-
pay" portion of uninsured motorist auto insurance policies and some
homeowners policies. These forms of entitlement are treated differ-
ently in the code from tort recoveries. Recoveries from tortiously
liable third parties are the personal property of the beneficiary and
subject to Medi-Cal's right to assert a lien under Sections 14124.70-
14124.79 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. An injury caused by
192. See Coughlin v. Blair, 41 Cal. 2d 587, 600-01, 262 P.2d 305, 312-13 (1953); see also Avery
v. Fredericksen & Westbrook, 67 Cal. App. 334, 336-37, 154 P.2d 41, 42-44 (1944).
193. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§14019.3, 14019.4, 14023, 14024, 14124.70-14124.79.
194. Compare CAL. WVELF. & INST. CODE §§14023, 14024 with id 14124.70-14124.79. Seegen-
erally Post Trial Brief for Defendant, Palumbo v. Myers, No. 287983 (Super. Ct., Sacramento,
1981).
195. The construction of a statute by the officials charged with its administration must be
given great weight, for their "substantially contemporaneous expressions of opinion are highly
relevant and material evidence of the probable general understanding of the times and of the
opinions of men who probably were active in the drafting of the statute." Whitcomb Hotel, Inc. v.
California Employment Conm'n, 24 Cal. 2d 753, 756-57, 151 P.2d 233, 235 (1944); see Gibson v.
Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 9 Cal. 3d 494, 498 n.6, 509 P.2d 945, 947 n.6, 108 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3
n.6 (1973); Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Employment Comm'n, 17 Cal. 2d 321, 325-26, 109
P.2d 935, 938-40 (1941).
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another does not give rise to a "legal entitlement" per se; only the
right to bring an action wherein liability to pay may or may not be
legally established.1
96
Since the law specifically gives the State the right to payment in both
the area of third party liability197 and other legal entitlements, 198 and
only gives the provider the right to collect additional compensation in
cases of other legal entitlements, 199 the law could be reasonably inter-
preted to mean that the Legislature did not intend to give providers the
right to receive full compensation in the case of third party liability.
The courts, therefore, probably will not overturn the interpretation by
the State of the current law. Further, in deciding this issue the courts
may take some time, and in the interim providers are subjected to the
interpretation of the law by the State.
B. Legislation
The enactment of a statutory amendment to the Welfare and Institu-
tions Code would be the most effective means of achieving the desired
results. The code could be amended to allow the provider to receive
compensation from the tort recovery.
The current organization of the Welfare and Institutions Code dis-
tinctly separates the right to reimbursement by the State from the rights
and restrictions regarding providers. 2°° Legislation which would in-
crease the provider's right to reimbursement would logically affect only
those sections of the Welfare and Institutions Code concerning provid-
ers. Specifically, sections 14019.3 and 14019.4, that affect the provider's
ability to receive additional compensation, should be amended to allow
providers to receive additional compensation in the instance of a tort
recovery where the patient has been compensated for the injury by a
liable third party. This comment proposes an amendment to these two
code sections as set forth in the appendix.
One problem which must be addressed when proposing an amend-
ment in this area is that federal law requires the provider to accept
payment by the Medicaid program as payment in full.20 1 This obstacle,
however, can be overcome by analogizing "third party liability" to
"other coverage." Although the State presents several reasons why bill-
196. Letter from Richard H. Koppes, Chief Counsel, Dept. of Health Services to Mary R.
Solbakken (Nov. 24, 1978).
197. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§14124.70-14124.79.
198. Id §§14023, 14024.
199. Id §§14019.3, 14019.4.
200. Id §§14019.3, 14019.4, 14023, 14024, 14124.70-14124.79.
201. See 42 U.S.C. §1396h(d) (Supp. I1 1979).
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ing the other insurer is allowable in light of federal law,2°2 the main
focus seems to be that once the actual flow of funds is complete, the
beneficiary's medical bills are paid for by someone other than Medi-
Cal, ie., the other insurer. This is also true, however, when the benefi-
ciary receives a tort recovery since once the Medi-Cal program has
been reimbursed, the medical bills have actually been paid for by
someone other than Medi-Cal, le., the liable third party. The State
would argue that this rationale does not apply to third party liability
since the State is seldom totally reimbursed from the tort recovery, and
therefore, has still paid for part of the services.20 3 One reason this oc-
curs, however, is because the State is prohibited by statute from receiv-
ing more than a certain portion of the recovery. 2° In addition, the
State may determine that it is in the best interest of those involved to
compromise the claim, thus reducing the amount the State would nor-
mally receive.20 Further, the State is required to pay for a portion of
the attorney's fees incurred.20 6 Thus, as a result of statutory prohibi-
tions as well as compromises by the State, the reimbursement of the
State often will not be an amount equal to the money paid for medical
services by the State. This certainly does not justify the argument that,
since the State has not been fully reimbursed, the provider should not
be allowed to receive any payment from the recovery, when in fact
Medi-Cal has the right to be fully reimbursed up to the amount legally
permissible.20 7 Furthermore, the argument by the State is not consis-
tent with the fact that theoretically the State is not always fully reim-
bursed from the other insurer.20 8 Moreover, if the provider billed the
other insurer first and the insurer paid less than the Medi-Cal amount
for that particular service, the provider could still bill the program for
an amount up to the Medi-Cal allowable charge.20 9 If the current law,
that allows providers to bill other insurers, has not come under the fed-
eral prohibition, then proposed legislation regarding third party liabil-
ity also would not be prohibited by federal law.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of the Medi-Cal program is to ensure that medical
202. See notes 51-61 and accompanying text supra.
203. See text accompanying note 77 supra.
204. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §14124.78.
205. Id §14124.71.
206. Id §14124.72.
207. Id §§14124.71, 14124.72, 14124.78.
208. The other coverage is only obligated to pay the amount that it contracted to pay for,
therefore, even if this contractual amount is less than Medi-Cal's fee, that is all the State will
recover. This will leave the State to absorb the excess.
209. See 22 CAL. ADM. CODE §51471; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §14019.4.
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treatment is made available to individuals who cannot otherwise obtain
medical care. Providers of medical services are encouraged to partici-
pate in the program, yet the payment for their services is relatively low.
Further, Medi-Cal prohibits the provider from billing the beneficiary
or any other person for the provision of medical services, once the pro-
vider has accepted Medi-Cal payment. This policy protects benefi-
ciaries from being held personally liable for the medical services
provided.
A problem occurs when a third party, such as other health insurance
or casualty insurance, is legally liable to pay for the medical services.
In this case, the question arises as to whether the provider may bill the
liable third party for the difference between his or her usual and cus-
tomary fee and the amount Medi-Cal has paid.
A close examination of the current application of the law regarding
third party liability and the Medi-Cal program has shown that an in-
consistent result is reached by distinguishing between "other coverage"
and "third party liability." Providers are allowed to receive additional
compensation when a beneficiary has other insurance coverage. Never-
theless, when the beneficiary receives special damages in a tort recov-
ery, designed to compensate him or her for medical expenses, the
beneficiary is only required to reimburse Medi-Cal for the amount it
paid the provider, which is approximately 50%-65% of the provider's
usual and customary fee.210 The beneficiary is not required to pay the
remainder of the special damages to the provider, but rather is allowed
to retain it, thereby placing the beneficiary in a better position
financially than before the injury.
State law has thus resulted in the Medi-Cal value for services being
interjected into a judicial system where the value for medical services
should be based on the reasonable value of the services provided as a
result of the tortious injury. An individual whose medical bills were
not paid for by Medi-Cal will be required to pay his or her provider the
reasonable value of the services rendered; whereas, the Medi-Cal bene-
ficiary is only required to pay the State a reduced Medi-Cal value for
the same services. In both cases, however, the special damages of the
tort recovery is based on the reasonable value of the medical services.
An equitable resolution to this problem would be to amend the cur-
rent law to allow the provider, when the beneficiary receives a tort re-
covery, to recover the difference between the amount paid by the Medi-
Cal program and the amount billed. This solution would allow the
210. See REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR, supra note 6, at 6.
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proceeds of a tort recovery to be applied in the manner intended by the
judicial system which made the recovery possible.
Maureen A. Falconer
APPENDIX
Sections 14019.3 and 14019.4 of the California Welfare and Institutions
Code should be amended (strike out indicating omit; underscore indi-
cating additions) to read as follows:
§14019.3 Return of payment for services otherwise covered by Medi-
Cal program; submission of claim for Medi-Cal
reimbursement
A beneficiary or any person on behalf of the beneficiary who has
paid for health care services otherwise covered by the Medi-Cal pro-
gram received by the beneficiary shall be entitled to a return from the
provider of any part of such payment which:
(1) Was rendered during any period prior to the receipt of his
Medi-Cal card, for which such card authorizes payment under Sec-
tion 14018 or 14019;
(2) Was reimbursed to the provider by the Medi-Cal program,
following all audits and appeals to which the provider is entitled;
(3) Is not payable by a third party under contractual or other
legal entitlementj Xd or a liable third party; and
(4) Was not used to satisfy his paid or obligated liability for
health care services or to establish eligibility.
Upon presentation of the Medi-Cal card or other proof of eligibility,
the provider shall submit a Medi-Cal claim for reimbursement, subject
to the rules and regulations of the Medi-Cal program. Payment re-
ceived from the state in accordance with Medi-Cal fee structures shall
constitute payment in full. The provider shall return any and all pay-
ments made by the beneficiary, or any person on behalf of the benefici-
ary, for Medi-Cal program covered services upon receipt of Medi-Cal
payment.
§14019.4 Proof of eligibility; prohibition against provider seeking re-
imbursement or payment for covered services; receipt;
exemption
(a) Any provider of health care services who obtains a label or copy
from the Medi-Cal card or other proof of eligibility pursuant to this
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chapter shall not seek reimbursement nor attempt to obtain payment
for the cost of such covered health care services from the eligible appli-
cant or recipient, or any person other than the department or third
party payer who provides a contractual or legal entitlement to health
care services/ or any other liable third party.
(b) Whenever a service or set of services rendered to a Medi-Cal
beneficiary results in the submission of a claim in excess of five hun-
dred dollars ($500), and the beneficiary has given the provider proof of
eligibility to receive such service or services, the provider shall issue the
beneficiary a receipt to document that appropriate proof of eligibility
has been provided. The form and content of such receipts shall be
determined by the provider but shall be sufficient to comply with the
intent of this subdivision. Skilled nursing facilities and intermediate
care facilities are exempt from the requirements of this subdivision.
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